






































































































From “Universal Values ” to Shared East Asian Values
Jiang Rong ZHU
Both Professors Brunkhorst and Fini have presented upon extremely interesting topics. If one were to apply 
Professor Brunkhorst’s expression “global hegemony” to contemporary America, it does seem to be most fi tting. 
Professor Fini’s description of the anti-Americanism in Europe in the nineteen thirties (1930’s), on the other hand, 
reminds me of China in the latter half of the nineteen nineties (1990’s). Both Professors Brunkhorst and Fini’s 
analyses treat Americanism from the perspective of the European experience and the Western Enlightenment. 
Rather than making comments, I would like to treat the issues that their papers raised for me from the perspec-
tives of China and East Asia.
First of all, let us look at things from the perspective of China. The opening line of a book by Yang Yu Sheng 
(楊玉聖) published in China in nineteen ninety-six (1996) entitled The Chinese View of America: An Historical 
Examination reads as follows: “For Chinese people, the country called America is an enigma.” It has long been 
said that the attitude of the Chinese government and that of the average citizen towards America are of differing 
degrees. However, the so-called “mistaken bombing” of the Chinese embassy by American warplanes in former 
Yugoslavia in May of 1999 incited the anger of all of China. In an essay entitled “The Historical Vicissitudes of 
the Chinese People’s Perception of America,” Professor Wang Ke (王柯) of Kobe University writes as follows 
about this incident: “On the evening of November thirtieth (30th), nineteen-eighteen (1918), students of Beijing 
University conducted a grand march to celebrate the victory of the First World War, and gathered at the American 
embassy where they shouted ‘Long live America!’ However, in opposition to the “mistaken bombing” of the 
 Chinese embassy by American warplanes in May of 1999, the students of Beijing University engaged in various 
acts of protest, among which, they burned the American fl ag in front of the American embassy. The respect and 
expectations that the Chinese people had for America, symbolized in their shout of ‘Long live America!’, became 
something like an apparition from past, even before the twentieth century had ended.” This very much resembles 
the Europe of the nineteen thirties (1930’s) that Professor Fini is talking about. If we assume that there is such a 
thing as anti-Americanism in China, it is somewhat different from that of Europe.
“Anti-Americanism” in China had already begun before the time of the “mistaken bombing” incident of 
1999. In 1994, the Chinese Young Peoples Research Center carried out a public-opinion poll in which more than 
sixty percent of Chinese people viewed America as their most hated country. It is thought that this was a reaction 
to the American discourse that labelled China as a “menace.” Moreover, if we go further back in history, the inhu-
mane treatment of, and prejudice towards, Chinese laborers by Americans at the end of the Ch’ing dynasty deeply 
affected Chinese sentiment. While it may be more appropriate to call this an “anti-American consciousess” than 
“anti-Americanism,” this sort of feeling was also present at that time. It is thought that anti-Americanism in the 
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cultural and political sense was broached in the book entitled Chinese People Who Can Say “No” published in 
1996. The basis for this was disappointment in America, as well as an issue of identity as  Professor Fini has also 
pointed out. While there are some who say that Chinese People Who Can Say “No” is a nationalistic tract, in fact, 
the authors are confronting a disappointment in Americanism in the exact same way that Professor Fini has 
described for Europe in the nineteen thirties (1930’s). The authors are merely attempting to seek and re-defi ne 
their own identity in a serious way. In China there is a proverb that goes, “If one loves deeply, the hatred born 
from this will also be deep.” The authors of this book once believed profoundly in the American dream and loved 
American culture. Statements such as “It is Americans who have stirred up our passion to criticize America,” 
found in Li Xi Guang and Liu Kang’s (李希光࡮劉康) book, show the earnestness of the Chinese criticism of 
America, and that China is gradually beginning to wake up from the American dream.
Next, I would like to consider these issues from the perspective of East Asia. First of all, as an example of 
the penetration of Americanism into East Asia, I would like to take up the notion of “common values.” The 
phrase, “common values,” is used to refer to the idea that America and Japan, among other countries, have a 
 commonly held democratic system. Addressing the question of just what the phrase “common values” actually 
means, Taniguchi Makoto, Japan’s formmer ambassador to the United Nations, wrote in his book entitled The 
East Asian Community that if “common values” means the three principles of “democracy,” a “market economy,” 
and “respect for human rights” as defi ned by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), there is no diffi culty in understanding this. However, if we take the notion of “a value system” in a 
broader, more general sense, it is doubtful that Japan and America hold the same set of values in common.
Mr. Taniguchi regards the the phrase “common values” as being a product of the Western Enlightenment, 
and sees the penetration of Americanism into East Asia as conditional. However, just as we routinely use the 
phrase “Europe and America” (in Japanese, “ōbei”), if we view things from the perspective of East Asia, Ameri-
canism is a part of the Western Enlightenment, and, at the very least, is perceived as part of the same cultural 
sphere as Europe. Even Europe, in confronting Americanism, is trying to distinguish an American sense of values 
(what Professor Fini calls “the American way of life”) from that of the traditional Western Enlightment. This 
means that we must recognize that our way of viewing “Europe and America” as a singular entity is mistaken. If 
this is the case, what is the criteria for “commonness” in the above-mentioned “common values?” Perhaps it is 
thought that a democratic system equals “common values.” However, against the notion that the American demo-
cratic system embodies these “common values” the following doubts remain.
The concept of “democracy” is not of recent origin, but was already advanced, experimented with, and 
implemented in ancient Greece. It fi rst became a modern political system from the eighteenth (18th) century in 
Europe and America, and then afterwards in other countries, mainly taking the form of a multiple party system 
with general elections. In the fi rst half of the twentieth (20th) century, this was systematically introduced in both 
Japan and Germany, but was unable to prevent war. After the war, it was restarted with many modifi cations, 
improvements and developments, and is today the common political system of Japan, America and the European 
Union (EU). It has many strong points. To say the least, history has shown that it is superior to Stalinist socialism. 
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Especially on account of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the democratic system has come to be seen as 
possessing universality.
However, we cannot overly glorify democracy. In the middle of the nineteen fi fties (1950’s), at the time of 
the Suez Canal War (also referred to as the second Middle East War), the danger of American-syle democratic 
nations being dragged into a war was, temporarily, a genuine possibility. And, as can be seen from events like the 
Vietnam War, democracy could not prevent the mass slaughter of human beings of other countries and the indis-
criminate destruction of the natural world. This is surely one instance of what Professor Fini calls America’s 
attempt, grounded in the Western discourse of good and evil, to impose its own values upon the world—that is, a 
levelling of values. Again, as exposed in hurricane-struck New Orleans, it has become clear that the racial preju-
dice and disparity between rich and poor in a democratic system has not been rectifi ed. A democratic system, 
characterized by such things as a multiple party system and general elections, will only function effectively when 
its economic and social development has reached a signifi cantly advanced stage, and when it continually reforms 
itself.
If American-style democracy is a “good” thing, and having a “democratic” system is equivalent to having 
“common values,” how are we to understand the following three points?
(1) First, although they have adopted democratic systems, in many third world countries there has emerged 
no solution to such problems as poverty and the provision for basic human needs. Moreover, today, in 
the world’s largest democratic nation, India, a caste system that assigns status to human beings from 
birth has not been done away with. Also, although more than half of all Latin American countries have 
become somewhat democratic, there has been no solution to such problems as the dominance of privi-
leged classes and poverty. On the contrary, this indicates that the leading industrial countries are, in 
many ways, robbing developing nations of their chance to prosper. (This is also called “the North-South 
problem.”)
(2) It does not follow that because a nation becomes democratic, all become “good people” and perform 
“good deeds,” and that dictatorships are prevented. Coups d’état, dictatorships and civilian revolts 
occur repeatedly in many developing countries that have adopted a democratic system. Although  Russia 
ended its former “one-party dictatorship” and has become “democratic,” there are indications of many 
anti-democratic movements appearing within the country. Moreover, “democratic” Russia is using mili-
tary force, with the tacit approval of the Western nations, in the Chechen Republic, which is seeking its 
national independence.
(3) China, which has not adopted a “democratic system,” is the country that has had the most rapid develop-
ment anywhere in the world, and has had the most conspicuous reduction of poverty. Also, accompany-
ing this economic and social development and the enlargement of the middle class in China, direct 
 elections are being introduced at the village level nationwide, and the supervision of government and 
government policy according to public consensus is beginning to be widely adopted.
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When we consider this, it is not possible to see the promotion of world harmony and cooperation, or the pro-
motion of so-called “common values” in the Enlightenment sense of this phrase, and it becomes diffi cult to view 
such “common values” as something appropriate for East Asia. Rather, we must consider for East Asia a “sense 
of values” common to the region—“common East Asian values.” We must promote the search for such a “com-
mon East Asian values” as the collaborative work of all East Asian countries and regions. This has, at the very 
least, the following three points of signifi cance for the region:
(1) The search for common social, cultural and other elements would allow for the broad view needed to 
overcome the friction and confrontation and that exists today between Japan, China and Korea. If the 
various points of friction are examined closely as phenomena belonging to a certain historical stage, 
there is no need to, and we should not, exaggerate or absolutize them.
(2) East Asia will transcend the ulterior motives of the superpowers in international politics, as well as the 
opposition between its own nations; it will promote peace and mutual understanding among all coun-
tries in the region; and the “common East Asian values” will serve as the theoretical underpinning for 
the formation of an “East Asian Community.” If we look at the course of post-war Europe, this is one 
necessary and indispensable part of laying the foundations for the construction of community.
(3) Finally, while acknowledging the strong points of the Western Enlightenment and of contemporary 
industrial society, hints for identifying and overcoming their problematic aspects will be discovered. 
And, this will perhaps become the groundwork that allows the East Asian Enlightenment to again make 
a contribution to the future of the entire world.
